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In this paper we analyze the effect of immigrants on native jobs in fourteen Western European countries.
We test whether the inflow of immigrants in the period 1996-2007 decreased employment rates and/or
if it altered the occupational distribution of natives with similar education and age. We find no evidence
of the first but significant evidence of the second: immigrants took "simple" (manual-routine) type
of occupations and natives moved, in response, toward more "complex" (abstract-communication)
jobs. The results are robust to the use of an IV strategy based on past settlement of different nationalities
of immigrants across European countries. We also document the labor market flows through which
such a positive reallocation took place: immigration stimulated job creation, and the complexity of
jobs offered to new native hires was higher relative to the complexity of destructed native jobs. Finally,
we find evidence that the occupation reallocation of natives was significantly larger in countries with
more flexible labor laws. This tendency was particularly strong for less educated workers.
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The net ﬂow of immigrants into Western Europe during the decade preceding the great
recession (1996-2007) was very large. Considering 14 countries1 the percentage of foreign-
born, shown in Figure 1, increased by more than 4 percentage points from less than 8% of
the population in 1996 to more than 12 % in 2007. By comparison, in the US, the presence
of foreign-born increased by a smaller percentage of the population (3%), going from 10.6%
of the total in 1998 to 13.6% in 2007.
Extensive literature has analyzed the labor market eﬀect of immigrants in US and in other
countries with large immigration ﬂows, such as Canada and Australia.2 With some disagree-
ment, researchers have emphasized two facts. First, immigration is relatively common among
workers with very high education levels (college or higher).3 These types of immigrants may
compete with highly educated natives but may also have positive productivity eﬀects, so
their overall wage impact on native workers is likely to be positive. Second, among workers
in the intermediate to low range of education, immigrants tend to be concentrated among
those with very low schooling levels. They also tend to take manual and routine occupations
(e.g. in construction and in the personal-household services sectors), which usually require
manual and physical skills rather than communication and interactive abilities. This may
generate strong competition for the least educated natives (e.g. Borjas (2003), Borjas and
Katz (2007)). However, the fact that natives are employed in larger numbers in occupations
that are diﬀerent from those taken by immigrants (Ottaviano and Peri (2011)) and the fact
that they tend to upgrade their jobs, in response to immigration (Peri and Sparber (2009)),
taking on more complex and communication-intensive tasks and leaving manual tasks to im-
migrants, protects them from such competition. Hence, even for the group of less educated
native workers, several economists do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant wage eﬀects of immigrants (e.g.
Card and Shleifer (2009), Ottaviano and Peri (2011)).
As far as European labor markets are concerned, economists have analyzed the impact of
immigrants in speciﬁc countries (see for instance Dustmann et al. (2008) for the UK, Glitz
1Namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom.
2See for instance Longhi et al. (2005) for a summary and meta-analysis of the literature on the wage eﬀect
of immigrants.
3This is not only true for US immigrants but also for immigrants to European countries. See for instance
Docquier et al.’s (2010) data and empirical analysis that emphasize this fact.
2(2011) for Germany and González and Ortega (2008) for Spain) using frameworks similar to
those applied to the United States. Often those types of analyses are forced to use variation
(of immigrants and labor market outcomes) across regions within a country. Hence, they are
subject to the concern, put forward in several studies (e.g. Borjas et al. (1996)), of identifying
an attenuated wage eﬀect relative to the possible national eﬀect. With the notable exception
of Angrist and Kugler (2003), we are not aware of any study that analyzes the impact of
immigration on European Labor markets considering evidence from all (or most) Western
European economies. In this paper, we ﬁll this gap by analyzing how immigration aﬀects net
employment and job specialization of natives and how these eﬀects vary across EU countries.
We use the European Labor Force survey to analyze the labor market eﬀects of immig-
rants, exploiting the variation of immigration rates across 14 EU countries over the recent
decade. Besides a large panel variation in the inﬂow of immigrants, European countries also
provide large variation in the institutional characteristics of their labor markets. These rich
sources of additional variation allow us to address a host of novel questions: Are some coun-
tries better equipped to absorb immigrants? Is the response of native workers to immigrants,
in terms of occupational mobility, stronger in countries with more ﬂexible labor markets?
Are these diﬀerences particularly relevant for some groups of workers?
In the broader picture, this paper also contributes to the understanding of the determin-
ants of a shift in demand and supply of productive tasks in Europe. In the recent decades,
an increase in employment within jobs requiring the use of complex and abstract skills, and
a decrease in employment within manual-routine type jobs has been documented for many
developed countries. In particular, these phenomena have been observed in the US (Acemo-
glu and Autor, 2010) as well as in Europe (Goos et al., 2009). In a search for common global
tendencies, that oﬀer explanations for the aforementioned trends, most of the economic re-
search (as summarized in Acemoglu and Autor (2010)) has focused on two factors: the eﬀect
of technology and the eﬀect of oﬀ-shoring. On one hand, information and communication
technologies have increased the productivity of complex-abstract jobs, while substituting for
routine manual (and routine non-manual) tasks. On the other, the internationalization of
production has allowed the relocation of simple and manual phases of production abroad,
but not (yet) the relocation of complex tasks. These two factors aﬀected the demand for
these tasks in developed countries.
In this paper we explore another dimension that may have produced a shift in the supply
3of tasks in rich countries: the increase in the immigrant labor force, especially from less
developed countries. Our hypothesis is that the inﬂow of these immigrants has increased
the supply of manual-physical skills in rich economies, but also shifted native workers to
more complex tasks. Hence, immigration has been an additional cause for the increase in
employment in cognitive and complex tasks by native workers.
Our empirical strategy consists of considering diﬀerent skill cells (represented by com-
binations of education and age in each country) across European countries. Each of them,
in the tradition of Borjas (2003), is a diﬀerentiated labor market (mobility of natives across
countries is small in Europe). Within each of them we consider a partition of productive
tasks into “complex” tasks (abstract and cognitive) and “simple” tasks (routine and manual
based). Such a partition follows the literature on the eﬀect of information technology on the
demand for productive tasks (e.g. Autor et al. (2003)) and the literature on “oﬀ-shorability”
of tasks (e.g. Crinò (2009) and Blinder (2006)). We consider this partition as relevant also
in determining the relative specialization of native and immigrant workers. Jobs that can
be easily codiﬁed, that are manual and repetitive in nature, are considered “simple” and
may be easily taken by foreign-born workers who may have more limited native language
skills and not know the intricacy of the culture, social norms and institutions of the host
country. If this is the case then an inﬂow of immigrants in a cell (labor market) increases the
supply of “simple” productive tasks in that cell. As we will show in a model of occupational
choice, natives, who have a comparative advantage in communication-abstract tasks, would
in response specialize in more “complex” tasks.
Using this structure we can then identify whether immigration has been a force promoting
the specialization of native workers in Europe toward abstract-complex occupations and
away from manual-routine ones. At the same time we can check whether such a shift in the
occupational distribution of natives took place with a net increase, decrease or no change in
employment for natives. To establish whether the increased specialization of natives, which
correlates with the inﬂow of immigrants, was actually caused by them we use an instrumental
variable approach. Our instrument, inspired by Altonji and Card (1991) and Card (2001),
is based on the fact that the share of foreign-born in 1990 within each European country,
by country of origin, is a predictor of their subsequent ﬂows into EU countries. Assuming
that shift in demand for foreign labor taking place between 1996 and 2007 does not vary
systematically with foreigners’ settlements in 1990, the instrument is correlated with relative
4task supply only through its eﬀect on the supply of immigrants. We also control for factors
that proxy shifts in the relative demand for complex-abstract tasks which may be country
or skill-speciﬁc.
Our main empirical ﬁndings are three. First, according to results obtained using our
preferred speciﬁcation (2SLS estimates with country by education and education by year ﬁxed
eﬀects), immigrants ﬂows do not cause a decrease in natives employment rates, but rather
increase them; moreover, higher immigration pushes natives to occupations with higher skill
contents: a doubling of the immigrants’ share in a labor market (deﬁned by skill-country cells)
increases natives’ specialization in complex skills by 6%. Second, we document that such a
positive reallocation takes place through an increase in the average complexity of jobs oﬀered
to new hires relative to separations. Third, we split countries in two groups, those with strong
employment protection laws (EPL) and those with weak employment protection. We then
allow the response of net employment and specialization of natives to diﬀer across groups.
We ﬁnd that the natives’ positive reallocation towards complex jobs triggered by migration
is more intense in less protected markets, in particular for workers with low education.
This implies that in countries with high EPL, less educated workers tend to remain in
simple-manual occupations that suﬀer much more the wage competition of immigrants, while
in countries with low EPL the mechanisms of upgrading natives’ occupations moves less
educated workers away from immigrants’ wage competition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3 respectively deﬁne a
theoretical model of immigration and natives’ specialization and discuss the identiﬁcation
strategy. Section 4 describes the datasets and the task variables. Results of the empirical
analysis on immigration and natives’ employment rates and occupations are reported in Sec-
tion 5, Section 6 analyzes the impact of immigrants separately on new hiring and separations
of natives, while Section 7 investigates how labor market institutions aﬀect the extent of the
occupational adjustment. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
2.1 Relative Demand of Tasks
We consider that each labor market (country) is divided into cells of workers with diﬀering
observable skills, experience and education. Similarly to Katz and Murphy (1992), Ottaviano
5and Peri (2011) and Peri and Sparber (2009), we use a categorization that distinguishes
between two education groups, those with secondary education or less and those with some
tertiary education and more. These two groups are clearly diﬀerentiated for the type of
jobs/production tasks that they perform. Within each group we consider ﬁve age sub-
groups. As in Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and Peri (2011), each of these skill groups
provides labor services that are somewhat diﬀerentiated because they use diﬀerent vintages
of technology and have had diﬀerent labor market experiences. Hence the structure of
competition-substitutability within a schooling group is diﬀerent from that across groups. We
capture this production structure by combining diﬀerent skill cells in a multi-stage nested
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function. In particular, output is
produced using capital and labor; labor is a CES aggregate of labor services from workers
in diﬀerent education groups and, in turn, each of those groups is a CES composite of labor
services of workers with diﬀerent ages. Such a structure imposes speciﬁc restrictions on
the cross-cell elasticities. We follow the well established practice of grouping skills that are
harder to substitute into the outer groups, increasing substitutability as we progress into the
inner nests. Card and Shleifer (2009) and Goldin and Katz (2007) argue that the split into
two schooling groups is the one preferred by the data and most of the literature organizes
the experience groups into bins of ﬁve or ten years. Our choice of nesting structure follows
their lead. Furthermore, the particular order of nesting does not matter for our results as
long as education-age cells are imperfectly substitutable groups of workers. For each country

























for each  (3)
,   and  are respectively output, total factor productivity, services of physical
capital and the aggregate labor services in country  and year .  is the composite
labor input from workers with the same level of education “”.  is the compos-
ite input from workers of education “” and age “”. The parameters  capture the
6relative productivity of each skill group within the labor composite. Notice that the relative
productivity of education groups  is allowed to vary across countries and over time
and the relative productivity of age groups  also varies by education, country and
time. The elasticities  and  regulate substitutability between labor services of
workers with diﬀerent education and age level.
The observable characteristics are education and age of a worker. We use the index 
(=) to identify each education-age cell. We consider these characteristics as given
at a point in time. In each skill-cell  we separate the labor services supplied as complex
tasks () and those supplied as simple tasks () and consider those inputs as imperfect













 and  are the amount of “simple” (manual, routine) and “complex” (abstract,
communication, mental) services supplied by the skill group  in country  and year .T h e
coeﬃcient  determines the relative productivity of simple tasks in the cell and the elasticity
 determines the substitutability between the two types of tasks in the cell. We call  the
compensation for one unit of service of complex work, and  the compensation for one
u n i to fs e r v i c eo fs i m p l ew o r k .T h i sa l l o w su st o derive the relative demand for complex and
simple services in skill group  by equating the ratio of their marginal productivity to the













The relative supply, the relative compensation and potentially the relative productivity of
simple and complex services vary with skill, country and year, hence the subscripts. Through-
out the remainder of the theory section we omit the  subscripts and we will re-introduce
them when describing the empirical speciﬁcation.
2.2 Relative Supply of tasks
As in Peri and Sparber (2009), we assume that native and immigrant workers divide their
labor endowment ( =1 ) between simple and complex tasks in order to maximize their utility.
Here, diﬀerently from Peri and Sparber (2009), we allow utility to depend positively on labor
wage and negatively on a stigma associated with simple working tasks. Hence, individuals
7of similar skill , if natives or immigrants, may have diﬀerent productivity in simple and
complex tasks as well as diﬀerent degrees of “dislike” (stigma) for earning as simple manual-
routine workers. The utility  for individuals of type ,w i t h =  indicating domestic
and  =  denoting foreign-born workers, is given by the following expression:
 =( )
 κ +( 1− )
  | {z }
Wage Income
−  ()
 κ | {z }
Stigma
 (5)
The ﬁrst part is the wage income. Each individual of type  has some task-speciﬁca b i l i t y
κ and  and, by allocating  units of labor to simple tasks and 1 −  units to complex
tasks, produces  =( )
 κ units of simple service and  =( 1− )

  of complex service
(with 1), compensated respectively at rate  and  per unit.4 However, the part of
income earned doing simple tasks does not convey the full utility of income as it may have
some stigma, disutility or penalty attached, represented by the second term in .P e o p l e
may dislike doing manual jobs, or the status in society of these jobs may be low, or there may
be some dislike of circumstances connected with the manual part of the job (being outside,
uncomfortable, etc.). We model this stigma-disutility as an “iceberg” cost on the part of the
income that is earned doing the simple tasks, with  between 0 and 1, as the parameter
that captures the intensity of such psychological cost/dislike. The second part of the utility
is essentially the equivalent amount of income that a person would give up in order to be
able to do a “complex” rather than a “simple” job.



















In this simpliﬁed model each native supplies (, ) task units and each immigrant
supplies (, ) so that members from each group will choose a common combination of
tasks (empirically an occupation). Each group will choose a new combination of tasks if
their relative compensation changes. The relative supply of complex tasks increases with the
relative compensation  and it increases with the relative ability in complex tasks of
the group, 
κ as well as with its dislike for manual-routine services 1
1− The aggregate task
4The assumption of 1 implies an internal solution: all individuals do at least some of each tasks. This
means that when a person spends almost the whole day doing only complex tasks (e.g. writing a complex
paper) it is eﬃcient to spend a little time doing simple tasks (such as cleaning up the desk).
8supply for native and foreign workers in skill ,c o u n t r y and year ,w i l le q u a lt h ep r o d u c t





numerator and denominator by employment in the cell).
Finally aggregating immigrants and natives we obtain the aggregate relative supply of













The term ()=( +) ∈ (01) is the share of simple tasks supplied by foreign-
born workers, and is a simple monotonically increasing transformation of the foreign-born
share of less educated workers,  = ( +).5 Hence, the aggregate relative supply of
tasks in the economy is a weighted average of each group’s relative supply, and the weights
are closely related to the share of each group in employment.
2.3 Equilibrium Results
Substituting (6) for natives and immigrants in (7) and equating relative supply with relative




































is a weighted average of the relative task abilities and of simple




































depends negatively on  and positively on 
κ and , as indicated by
the signs in equation (8).
By substituting the equilibrium wage into the aggregate relative supply for domestic








































The equilibrium expression (9) is the basis for the empirical analysis. In particular, based
on its logarithmic derivative of (9), the model predicts a positive impact of the share of






0()  0, (0) = 0 and (1) = 1
93 Empirical implications and identifying assumptions
Expression (9) holds for each skill-country-year cell; taking the logarithm of both sides of
the equation and explicitly writing the subscripts in the variables for each skill-country-time








=  · ln()+ +  +  (10)
The term 
 is the measure of relative complex versus simple tasks provided by home-born
workers in the speciﬁc cell. This relative supply is responsive to the relative compensation
of tasks, which in turn depends on the share of immigrants (ln(), in logarithm) in the









 0. The country by education eﬀect  captures

































.T h e s e
features of the native and immigrants population depend on the skill group and on the
country, but not on the year. A certain country, due to its laws and institutions selects
immigrants with certain productivity and preference characteristics (by skill group) relative
to natives. This, however, changes only slowly with time and we assume that it is constant
over the considered period. The education by time eﬀects  absorb the variation of






 T h er e l a t i v ep r o d u c t i v i t yo f
simple and complex tasks may evolve over time. For instance, a common complex-biased
technological progress that aﬀects college educated workers more than less educated ones over
t h ec o n s i d e r e dy e a r sw o u l db ec a p t u r e db yt h e s ee ﬀects. The term  is an idiosyncratic
random shock (or measurement error) with average 0 and uncorrelated with the explanatory
variables. Our main interest is in estimating  Our model predicts a positive value of ,a sa
larger share of immigrants would increase returns for complex tasks relative to simple tasks
and hence push natives to specialize further into those tasks with potential productivity and
wage gains. The magnitude of that eﬀect is an empirical question.
3.1 Discussion of Endogeneity
Once we control for the cell-speciﬁc selection and for the technological factors, we are as-
suming that the remaining variation over time in the share of immigrants across cells within
10country-year is driven by the exogenous variation of immigrant supply. In particular, in
the OLS estimates we are assuming that, after controlling for the ﬁxed eﬀects, the whole
variation of  is exogenous. Residual correlation could still be present if, for example,
skill upgrading is taking place among native workers of a particular country, irrespective
of immigration. This would determine the excess demand for unskilled workers and, thus,
attract immigrants. We deal with this potential bias emerging from reverse causality in two
ways.
First, in all speciﬁcations we deﬁne  as the share of foreign born individuals on total
population (rather than employment) within each cell. Immigrant population is by and large
determined by factors in the sending countries, the costs of migration, as well as immigra-
tion laws. Of course, employment opportunities (driven by labor demand conditions) aﬀect
immigration choices and hence the whole population in a cell may still depend on unob-
served labor demand shocks. Hence we also include country by education and education by
year ﬁxed eﬀects, capturing systematic diﬀerentials across cells in relative Complex/Simple
task demand driven by technology (education by year) and country-speciﬁcity (country by
education).
Second, we also address the potential omitted variable bias with an instrumental variable
strategy.6 In particular, from IPUMS-I (2010) we downloaded micro-data from national
Censuses 1990-1991, for seven of the fourteen countries included in the ELFS (Austria,
France, Greece, Italy,7 Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom). For that year, we computed
the population of immigrants by area of origin (using nine large geographic groups8)i ne a c h
country-education-age cell and the native population in each of those cells. We have then used
the data on yearly immigration ﬂows into OECD countries by country of origin from Ortega
and Peri (2011). Those data, described in detail in Ortega and Peri (2011), were collected
from several sources (OECD, UN) and report the total gross inﬂow of migrants from any
country into OECD countries. Based on these gross ﬂows, we construct yearly net inﬂows
by attributing a 40% re-migration rate to immigrants. Further, for each year within the
6This strategy has evolved as a favorite one in this literature since its ﬁrst use by Altonji and Card (1991).
7For Italy we used 2001 data, the ﬁrst ones providing all necessary information. Nevertheless, for this
country ELFS data are available starting with 2005 and not with 1996, so that the shares are still calculated
according to the distribution of immigrants taking place 4 years before the estimation interval starts.
8The groups of origin of immigrants are: North Africa, Other Africa, North America, Central and South
America, Middle East and Central Asia, South and Eastern Asia, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Oceania.
11period 1996-2007 and the seven EU countries in our sample, we break net immigration rates
down by the nine areas of origin mentioned above. Multiplying the resulting origin-speciﬁc
growth rates by the 1991 stock of immigrants in each education-age-country cell allows
us to infer origin-cell-speciﬁc stocks of immigrants at an annual frequency. We aggregate
across countries of origin, in order to impute the total stock of immigrants at the education-
age-country level for each year within the period 1996-2007. Finally, we obtain shares of
immigrants on the cell-year level by representing the imputed population of immigrants as
a fraction of the total population, assuming that the number of natives remained at its 1991
level. This method implies that the variation in shares obtained across cells and years is only
driven by the initial cell composition of immigrants by origin and the variation in inﬂows
across origin groups in Europe over time. If a country had a lot of young and highly educated
Algerians in 1991 (rather than, say, young and less educated Filipinos) and Algerians turned
out to increase their immigration rates more than Filipinos in the considered period, the ﬁrst
country would obtain a larger group of educated young immigrants as of 2007 relative to the
second.
The underlying exclusion assumption is that, while immigrants of certain origins tend to
settle where historical communities of similar origin already are, in order to exploit networks
and supply of ethnic public goods, the 1991 distribution of immigrants by origin is unrelated
to changes in labor demand during the 1996-2007 period. The instrument turns out to be
fairly strong (ﬁrst stage statistics are reported in Table A5 of the appendix). In particular
the F-test of the constructed IV for the whole sample is around 69 when considering men
and women and 58 when considering men only. Such strong correlation is a sign that the
composition of immigrants and the subsequent ﬂo w sb yo r i g i nw o r ka ss t r o n gp r e d i c t o ro f
the increase in immigrants in a cell. This shows that the network of previous immigrants
reduces costs of settling and ﬁnding a job for new immigrants of similar origin.
Since we can only calculate the initial 1991 shares of immigrants on a subset of 7 out of 14
countries, we analyze three alternative speciﬁcations for our main regressions. First, based
on all the 14 countries, we estimate equation (10) using OLS with ﬁxed eﬀects. Second, we
restrict the OLS analysis to the sample of 7 countries for which we have the instruments,
and ﬁnally, we employ the 2SLS strategy outlined above for this subset of countries.
123.2 Empirical Implementation
Our empirical analysis consists of four parts. First, after a brief introduction of our data
in Section 4, we begin by analyzing the impact of immigration on natives’ employment
rates in Section 5.1. While this is of interest in itself, it also complements the subsequent
analysis of relative skill eﬀe c t s ,b a s e do ne q u a t i o n( 1 0 ) . I nt h es e c o n dp a r t ,w ec o n t i n u e
by quantifying the adjustment in the distribution of skills across diﬀerent types of workers,
which is potentially triggered by immigrants’ ﬂows (Section 5.2). As a preliminary step,
we separately investigate the eﬀects of immigration on the total amount of “complex” as
well as “simple” tasks performed by native workers. We do so by estimating two models,
akin to equation (10), with ln() and ln() as the respective dependent variables.
The aim is to gauge the impact of immigration on the numerator and the denominator of
the left hand side of equation (10) in isolation. This decomposition helps us to understand
whether a potential relative reallocation takes place with a net increase or a net decrease in
the intensity with which native workers perform the two respective types tasks.
In order to check whether the regularities found for the composite “complex” and “simple”
task measures are also present at a more disaggregate level, we run separate regressions for
each of the underlying basic task components.9 As an additional robustness check we further
estimate the impact of immigration on alternative measures of “complex” and “simple” task
intensity taken from Goos et al. (2009).
We conclude the second part by estimating the impact of immigration on relative task
levels (our main speciﬁcation, equation (10)), in order to empirically test the equilibrium
conditions (equation (9)) derived from the model outlined in Section 2.
The third part (Section 6) outlines our approach to investigate the labor market ﬂows
behind the potential task adjustment in response to immigrant inﬂows. In particular, we
inquire whether native workers’ labor reallocation takes place through systematic changes in
the hiring (job creation) or separation (job destruction) margin.
Finally, in Section 7, we test whether country-level labor market policies, in particular
employment protection laws, are fostering or discouraging a potentially favorable skill real-
location. The process we envision is a dynamic shift of native workers across occupations.
Thus, the ease of transition between jobs within a particular country is potentially a crucial
component in determining the strength of this channel.
9See Section 4.1 for details on the construction of our skill measures.
134 Data and descriptive statistics
The main dataset we use is the harmonized European Labour Force Survey (ELFS), which
homogenizes and groups together country speciﬁc surveys at the European level (see EURO-
STAT (2009)). We restrict our analysis to the period 1996-2007 since before 1996 data on
the place of birth of individuals are absent for most countries in the survey. We restrict our
analysis to the working age population (age 15-64) of Western European countries only.10
The data include information on the occupation, working status and demographic charac-
teristics of the individuals. Unluckily the ELFS does not include any information on their
wages. We dropped observations with missing data on education, age or country of birth,
which are fundamental for our empirical analysis. Only in 16 out of 168 (14 countries × 12
years) country-year cells one of these variables, fundamental for our analysis, was completely
missing and we had to drop it.11
In line with previous literature, we classify as immigrants all individuals born in any
country (both EU or non-EU) outside the considered one. We do not use the ﬁrst year of data
(1995) since in that year the country of birth variable was missing in 4 out of 14 countries.
In Figure 1 we show the evolution of the share of foreign born on the aggregate population
of the sample countries during the 1996-2007 period analyzed here. In this ﬁgure, we pool
data from all countries except Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and United Kingdom, for which
data are missing for one or more years. The share of foreign born in the total population
increased by more than 4 percentage points from below 8% in 1996 to 12.3% in 2007. This
increase was, on average, rather evenly distributed across educational levels (as one can see
from Figure A1 in the Tables and Figures appendix).
In the empirical analysis, for each year between 1996 and 2007, we aggregate the indi-
vidual data to the country-level, two educational levels (upper secondary education or less
and strictly more than upper secondary education) and ﬁve ten-year age-classes covering
individuals between 15 and 64 years of age. Our analysis includes both women and men,
and as a robustness check we also show the results of the speciﬁcations including only men.
10We include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom. We could not include Germany since main variables,
including place of birth, were missing for most years.
11See Table A1 of the Tables and Data appendix for the full list of country/years. The table illustrates
missing values as well as the subset of cells included in the 2SLS speciﬁcations.
144.1 Task variables
To test the predictions of the model in Section 2, especially the equilibrium condition (10),
we need indicators of the intensity of skills supplied in each job over time. Following Peri
and Sparber (2009) and considering occupations as capturing the diﬀerent types of jobs per-
formed, we use the O*NET data from the US Department of Labor (version 11, available at
http://www.onetcenter.org/). This survey, started in 2000 (when it replaced the Dictionary
of Occupational Titles, DOT), assigns values summarizing the importance of several diﬀerent
abilities to each of 339 Occupations (according to the Standard Occupation Classiﬁcation,
SOC). We use 78 of these tasks to construct our measures of skill-intensity for each occupa-
tion. As the scale of measurement for the task variables is arbitrary, we convert the values
into the percentile of the task intensity in the 2000 distribution of occupations. We create
ﬁve abilities’ measures: communication, complex, mental, manual and routine. For example,
skills used to construct the communication category include, among others, oral comprehen-
sion, oral communication and speech clarity; manual dexterity and reaction time are among
the skills used to construct the manual category and so on. Table A2 of the appendix in-
cludes the full list of the skills/tasks measures employed to construct each of the indicators.
When we consider only two broad groups, complex and simple,t h ecommunication, complex
and mental skills are included in the complex group, while manual and routine form the
simple one. In some of the empirical speciﬁcations, we also use the alternative abstract and
routine classiﬁcations employed by Goos et al. (2009) as a robustness check.12
For each indicator, we merge occupation-speciﬁc values to individuals in the 2000 Census
using the SOC codes. Then, using the Goos et al. (2009) crosswalk, we collapse the more
detailed SOC codes into 21 2-digit occupations classiﬁed according to the International Stand-
ard Classiﬁcation of Occupations (ISCO) which is the classiﬁcation used by the ELFS. We
aggregate the scores (between 0 and 1) for each of the task intensity measures as a weighted
average of the SOC occupations into the ICSCO one. The weights used are the share of
workers for each SOC occupation in the total of the ISCO grouping, according to the 2000
US Census. To give an idea of the indicators, the ISCO occupation “corporate managers”
that gets a score of 0.79 in communication skills indicates that 79% of all workers in the US
in 2000 were using communication skills less intensively than corporate managers. Table A3
of the appendix shows the score for each of the ability indexes in the 21 occupations provided
12These measures employ a diﬀerent set of skills and are normalized with zero mean and unitary variance.
15by the ELFS. For example, Drivers and mobile plant operators is the occupation with the
highest manual ability intensity, while it is the second to last occupation when considering
complex abilities. On the other hand, Corporate Managers are highly ranked among complex,
mental and communication skills while being relatively less intensive in manual and routine
abilities. In Table A4 we report simple correlations between each of the ability measures and
some dummies that capture speciﬁc education or age level groups consistent with our cell
partition in the empirical analysis. Two patterns emerge clearly in the correlations between
observable skills and complex/simple tasks. First, there is a strong positive (negative) cor-
relation between the high education dummy and complex (simple) abilities. The schooling
level aﬀects the relative productivity in the two tasks and hence it is very important to
control for it. Second, manual and routine abilities are positively correlated with young age
dummies, while the opposite is true for more sophisticated skills such as complex, mental
and communication skills. Those skills exhibit a negative correlation with the lowest age
level dummy (15-24), turning positive and then reaching a maximum with the age-dummy
35-44 to decrease afterward. These patterns are not surprising and they emerge even when
considering alternative skill deﬁnitions taken from Goos et al. (2009).
Looking at the aggregate European data shows patterns consistent with the idea that
immigrants and natives specialize in diﬀerent production tasks and this specialization in-
creased over time. Figure 2, for instance, shows the evolution of the relative intensity of
complex versus non-complex tasks for the average European Worker throughout the period
1996-2007, split by native and foreign-born workers.13 While the average native worker (as
inferred from their occupational distribution) increasingly specialized in complex production
tasks, the average immigrant worker experienced the opposite trend. Immigrants’ specializ-
ation remained almost unchanged, slightly moving toward more manual-routine jobs. Such
a pattern would be hard to explain as consequence of a demand shock for relative tasks. In
that case the trend would be common to the two types of workers. The divergent evolution,
to the contrary, suggests that there is an increasing specialization, along the lines of com-
parative advantages, between the two groups. It also implies that recent immigrants have
been taking much more manual-intensive jobs than natives, possibly because their schooling
is lower or because their countries of origin have not provided them with complex skills. Fig-
13Relative intensity of complex versus non-complex tasks is the ratio of the two intensities, where the former
is equal to the average intensity in complex, mental and communication tasks, while the latter is the average
intensity in manual and routine tasks. See Section 4 for details.
16ure 3 illustrates additional stylized evidence supporting the model in Section 2. It shows the
correlation between the relative complex/non-complex task specialization of native workers
across cells (age-education groups across EU countries) and the share of immigrants. The
picture shows a positive and signiﬁcant correlation between the share of immigrants and the
specialization of natives in complex tasks. According to an OLS regression, a 10 percentage
point increase in the share of immigrants within the total population of similarly skilled indi-
viduals is associated with a 4 percentage point increase in relative complex/non-complex task
intensity. This coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 10% level with a standard error of 0.219. To
give an idea of the magnitude, this 10 percentage point increase in the share of immigrants
would be associated with a change in complex/non-complex task intensity slightly bigger
than the diﬀerence between United Kingdom (54.6) and Italy (50.9) in 2007.
5 Main Empirical results
5.1 Immigrants and Employment rates of Natives
Before estimating equation (10), we estimate a similar speciﬁcation to inquire whether im-
migration had a net impact on the employment rates of natives across skill groups. As
mentioned before, the employment eﬀects of immigration are relevant in itself. Furthermore,
an increase in relative skill complexity in equation (10) could either be driven by the destruc-
tion of “simple” jobs for a given number of “complex” ones or, alternatively, by a favorable
reallocation of native workers toward relatively more “complex” jobs. In the former case,
the set of workers losing their “simple” job (without getting a more “complex” one instead)
would certainly suﬀer from immigration. Quite contrarily, in the latter case, the group of
native workers who are aﬀected by immigration might very well be equally or even better
oﬀ, as they transition to an occupation characterized by more “complex” tasks.
Considering diﬀerent education-age skill cells in European countries as separate labor






=  ln()+ +  +  (11)
where () is the employment-population ratio for natives and ln() is the
logarithm of the share of foreign-born workers in the education-age group ,l i v i n gi nc o u n t r y
 in year ;  and  are sets of country-education and education-year ﬁxed eﬀects,
17capturing demand changes common to education groups over time and demand diﬀerences
across countries. Finally,  is an idiosyncratic random shock. Table 1 reports the estimates
of the coeﬃcient  for diﬀerent speciﬁcations of equation (11). The ﬁrst three columns show
the results when both women and men are included in the sample, while columns four to
six show the results when only men are included. In each case, we estimate the equation
in three diﬀerent ways. In a ﬁrst speciﬁcation (columns 1 and 4) we estimate equation
(11) using OLS and the whole group of fourteen countries analyzed in this study. In the
second set of OLS estimates (columns 2 and 5) we restrict the sample to 7 countries for
which national census data allow us to construct the initial shares of immigrants for year
1991, necessary to compute the shift-share instrument introduced in Section 3.1. Finally, in
columns 3 and 6, we estimate the equation via 2SLS on the same subset of countries using
the imputed shares of immigrants as IV. We also diﬀerentiate among rows. In the ﬁrst row
we report the estimates for equation (11), assessing the average impact of immigration on
natives’ employment rates. In the second and third row we estimate the age speciﬁci m p a c t
by interacting the explanatory variable ln() with a dummy equal to one for cells in the
age class 15-40 (young) and another equal to one in the age class 41-64 (old), respectively.
Finally in the fourth and ﬁfth row we estimate education speciﬁce ﬀect by interacting the
same explanatory variable with dummies for Lo wa n dH i g he d u c a t i o nl e v e l s .U n d e r n e a t ht h e
estimated coeﬃcients we report robust standard errors clustered by education-age-country
cells in order to allow for within-cell correlation over time, as certainly some autocorrelation
can be present in yearly data.
The estimated coeﬃcients of Table 1 are consistently positive and signiﬁcant across all
speciﬁcations, and they range between +0.243 and +0.463. These estimates imply that a
one per cent increase in the foreigners’ share of the population within the cell is associated
with an increase in the native employment/population ratio around 0.3 per cent of its initial
value. The OLS estimates, in spite of the dummies controlling for education-speciﬁcd e m a n d
shifts and for country-speciﬁc determinants may still contain some demand-driven spurious
correlation. However the 2SLS estimates (e.g., column 3) show that our estimates are con-
sistent with a causal eﬀect of immigration equal to 0.37% on the employment/population
ratio of native workers (0.28% on native males). No signiﬁcant diﬀerences emerge between
estimated coeﬃcients when considering the whole sample versus the restricted one or when
using 2SLS instead of OLS. The impact on the employment rate, however, looks somewhat
18smaller when considering male workers only. The inﬂow of immigrants could be complement-
ary in particular to the employment opportunities of women, partly for labor market reasons
(specialization as described in this paper), partly for the reasons described in Tessada and
Cortes (2011) and due to the fact that some services, provided by immigrants, substitute for
the house-work of women and allow them to supply more labor on the market.
Interesting results come when we allow the employment eﬀect of immigrants to diﬀer
across groups. Higher elasticities are estimated for young workers and more educated workers
(especially when including women in the sample). While the point estimates are suggestive
of these tendencies the standard errors are too large to ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences among the
group-speciﬁcc o e ﬃcients. In general, however, immigration seems to stimulate employment
growth in the considered European countries.
5.2 Immigrants’ and natives’ specialization
To inquire into the eﬀects of immigration on task specialization of natives, the heart of our
paper, we implement a series of speciﬁcations, following the structure of (10) and, in general,
estimate the coeﬃcient  from the following type of regression:
ln() =  · ln()+ +  +  (12)
The coeﬃcient , once we control for country-education and education-year ﬁxed
eﬀects ( and ), identiﬁes the impact of immigration on the intensity of a certain
“Skill” supplied by a native worker. A positive and signiﬁcant value of  implies that
an increase in immigrants in the cell pushes natives to use a particular “Skill” (perform
skill-speciﬁc tasks) more intensively relative to cells with smaller inﬂows of immigrants. We
estimate equation (12) for the ﬁve diﬀerent skill measures (introduced in Section 4.1) that
we also aggregate to construct average indexes for the “complex” (mental, complex and
communication skills) and “simple” (manual and routine) content of each occupation. As a
further robustness check we also use the “abstract” and “routine” measures, employed by
Goos et al. (2009) which are based directly on the ISCO occupational classiﬁcation. These
last indicators are deﬁn e db yad i ﬀerent classiﬁcation of skills and are normalized with zero
mean and unitary variance.14 In Table 2 we report OLS and 2SLS (columns 3 and 6) results,
14Given the presence of negative values for these indicators we do not estimate equation (12) in logs but in
levels.
19based on the shift-share IV strategy described above.15 Robust standard errors, clustered on
education-age-country, are reported underneath the estimates. As in Table 1, the ﬁrst three
columns are estimated on the whole sample, while columns 4 to 6 include men only.
The estimates of Table 2 are very consistent across speciﬁcations, samples and task
deﬁnitions. First, for all the estimates higher shares of immigrants in a cell are associated
with higher intensity of complex tasks performed by native workers. Using our task measures,
the estimated elasticity is between 0.047 and 0.054 for communication tasks and between
0.045 and 0.056 for complex tasks, while it is slightly higher (0.06 to 0.081) for mental ones.
These elasticities imply that a doubling of the share of immigrants in a cell (say from 2
to 4% of employment) is associated with an increase in the supply of the relevant tasks by
natives between 4.5 and 8.1%. When considering “simple” skill measures, the eﬀects are
usually smaller and more imprecisely estimated: for “manual” tasks, the elasticity is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the OLS estimates, while it is marginally signiﬁcant and
equal to 0.065 only in the 2SLS ones. A similar picture emerges for “routine” tasks, with
an elasticity of 0.036 (smaller than for complex tasks) using the OLS estimates, increasing
to 0.067 for the 2SLS speciﬁcation. When considering the alternative Goos et al. (2009)
deﬁnitions, we ﬁnd positive and signiﬁcant (in most cases) elasticities for abstract tasks,
w h i l ef o rr o u t i n et a s k st h ec o e ﬃcient estimates are negative and are not statistically diﬀerent
from zero. While there is no overwhelming evidence of a reduction in the supply of “simple”
skills by natives in response to immigration, there is clear evidence of a robust increase in
complex skill supply. Our model has implications for the relative supply of those skills.
Table 3 reports the estimates of the coeﬃcient  from regression (10), the empirical im-
plementation of the equilibrium derived in Section 2. This coeﬃcient shows the impact of
immigrants on the relative task supply, deﬁned as the ratio between the average of complex
skills (abstract, complex and communication) and the average of non-complex skills (manual
and routine). In the ﬁrst row, we show a set of estimates for the average elasticity across
the usual 6 diﬀerent speciﬁcations, all workers versus only men and OLS on the complete
sample, OLS and 2SLS on the sub-sample for which the instrument is available. Our point
estimates are very precise, strongly signiﬁcant, and range between 0.052 and 0.061; the only
exception is the 2SLS estimate for the sample including men only, which is positive but non
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This conﬁrms that, in relative terms, native workers increase
15For the ﬁrst-stage statistics see Table A5 of the Table appendix.
20their supply of complex skills that are complementary to those supplied by immigrants, pre-
valently manual-routine. When checking for possible diﬀerent elasticities of immigration for
individuals of diﬀerent age, we ﬁnd no substantial diﬀerences between the parameters estim-
ated for young/old workers, ranging between 0.05 and 0.06 in both cases. When restricting
t h es a m p l et om e n ,w eﬁnd a slightly greater elasticity for young compared to old workers,
b u tw er e m a i nr e a s s u r e db yt h es t a b i l i t yo fp a r ameter estimates. When considering native
workers diﬀering in their educational level, we ﬁnd higher elasticities for workers with low
education, but this pattern is evident only when using the full sample including both women
and men. Let us emphasize that the task response of natives to immigration estimated here
has been convincingly documented by Peri and Sparber (2009) for US workers. In that case
the authors only consider less educated workers (of both sexes) and use an IV method. Hence,
they obtain a coeﬃcient comparable with the one estimated in the fourth row, column 3 of
Table 3. Interestingly, while we estimate a signiﬁcant eﬀect in both cases, the magnitude of
Peri and Sparber’s (2009) coeﬃcient (in the range of 0.30-0.35) is much larger than the one
estimated in this paper. Namely, the coeﬃcient estimated using immigration across states
in the US is 5 to 6 times larger than the one estimated for Europe. Such a quantitative
diﬀerence can have important implications in evaluating the impact of immigration on nat-
ive wages. More interestingly, the reason for such a diﬀerence can be a large diﬀerential
in employment protection laws that prevent the same amount of occupational mobility in
Europe. Thus, we use cross-European diﬀerences to emphasize this point in the Section 7.
Overall, the main result of this section is that, employing 6 speciﬁcations, diﬀering for the
estimating sample and the econometric technique adopted, we ﬁnd strong empirical support
for the idea that an increase of the immigrants’ share on population pushes native workers
to move to occupations requiring a relatively higher complexity. The results presented in
Section 5.1 also show that this positive reallocation did not take place at the expense of
the total number of jobs available for natives. To the contrary, occupational mobility and
employment growth seem to take place at the same time. Hence, the results imply that, on
average, natives move to occupations with a larger content of “complex” tasks and about
the same content of “manual-routine” tasks. A larger supply of “manual-routine” tasks from
immigrants produces higher demand for “complex” tasks from natives and, on average, they
increase their supply of those.
In the next two sections we will explore the channels through which positive labor realloc-
21ation is taking place, and we will also assess the role of country-level labor market institutions
in helping, preventing or accommodating such a reallocation.
6T h e r o l e o f l a b o r m a r k e t ﬂows
While our model is static and provides predictions on the task supply and on the employment
of a representative agent, it is also interesting (and feasible with our data) to empirically
decompose the relevance of hiring and separations in producing the aggregate eﬀect. The
current economic literature on migration focusses only on the impact of immigration on
the employment levels and wages of native workers. In this section, however, we depart
somewhat from this literature as well as our model. In particular, we try to discover the
channels through which the empirically signiﬁcant labor reallocation found in the previous
section takes place. The increase in the relative intensity of “complex” skills of jobs held by
natives and the increase of their net employment could be obtained because of eﬀects on one
or more of the following margins:
i) Immigrants could induce more hiring, particularly concentrated in occupations requir-
ing relatively complex skills
ii) Immigrants could induce fewer separations particularly in occupations requiring relat-
ively complex skills
iii) Immigrants could induce more job to job transitions from less complex to more complex
jobs.
With the dataset at hand, we are able to analyze the impact of immigration on the ﬁrst
two types of ﬂows. This is because, in the survey, each respondent is asked about his/her
labor market state and occupation a year before the survey, in case this status has changed
during the last year. This information allows us to deﬁne two binary variables, “hiring” and
“separations”. The “hiring” (“separations”) variable is equal to one if the individual was not
employed (was employed) in year −1 and is employed (is not employed) in year  and zero
otherwise. We then compute the hiring (separation) rate for each country-age-education-year
cell as the ratio between the total number of hires (separations) and the population within
the cell in each year. Moreover, as we know the occupation currently held by the individual
(and the one previously held if the worker does not have a current job) we can also compute
22the average relative complexities of hiring and separations. Unfortunately, since respondents
are asked about their occupation last year only if they do not have a current one, job to
job transitions cannot be analyzed. We estimate the impact of immigration on labor market
ﬂows estimating a set of four equations identical to equation (10) and (11), but having,
respectively, as dependent variables: hiring and separation rates (rather than employment
rates), and average complexity of hiring and separations (rather than of total employment).
As in the previous empirical analysis we estimate these equations both on the whole sample
(column 1 to 3) and on men only (column 4 to 6); moreover, we run the regressions using
OLS on all the 14 countries (column 1 and 4), or on the restricted sample of 7 countries for
which we are able to calculate the shift-share instrument (column 2 and 5) or using 2SLS as
the estimation method on the restricted sample (column 3 and 6).
An interesting pattern emerges across speciﬁcations and it is particularly clear when
considering our preferred speciﬁcation, namely the 2SLS estimation with all workers, reported
in column 3 of Table 4. One way to summarize the pattern is as follows: an increase in
immigration alters the quantity and the quality of the transitions into and out of employment.
In our 2SLS speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd a marginally signiﬁcant impact of foreign-born inﬂows
in stimulating hiring and no impact at all on separation rates, as previously deﬁned. In
particular, an increase of immigrants by 1% of their share has a positive impact of 0.42%
on the hiring rate of native workers while it has no impact at all on the separation rates
for natives. Hence, in net terms, immigration encourages new hires of natives and this may
be one channel for the positive employment eﬀect found in Table 1. At the same time,
for a given size of the ﬂows (into and out of employment) an increase in the number of
immigrants within a cell is associated with an increase in the average relative complexity
of jobs oﬀered to new hires. The estimate for this elasticity is between to 0.081 (signiﬁcant
at the 1% level) based on the OLS estimates and 0.119, still signiﬁcant at the 1% level,
when considering the 2SLS estimates. Estimates are similar, but lower in magnitude, when
employing the sample including men only. When considering the separation margin, the eﬀect
of immigrants on the relative complexity of separations also has a positive sign. However,
for the sample pooling women and men together, the elasticities’ estimates are 30 to 40%
smaller compared to hiring (with an eﬀect between 0.05 and 0.07) while, when using the
male-only sample, coeﬃcient estimates are very close to zero, ranging from 0.007 to 0.01,
and are not statistically signiﬁcant. These results are thus coherent with the overall labor
23reallocation process described in the previous section, also providing additional details on
the channels through which this process operates. The magnitude of labor market ﬂows
into and out of employment is mainly aﬀected by immigrants via an increase in hiring, and
a substantial skill upgrading is obtained because the relative complexity of the new hires
increases with immigration while the relative complexity of separations is less aﬀected by
immigration. Unfortunately, due to data limitations we cannot look at job to job transitions,
another important margin of labor reallocation.
7D i ﬀe r e n c e sa c r o s sL a b o rM a r k e tI n s t i t u t i o n s
The positive reallocation of natives toward more complex skills could be slowed by rigid
labor markets. Labor markets with strong employment protection may reduce mobility in
and out of employment, they may also keep workers within the boundaries of narrowly
deﬁned occupations as workers’ protection (via collective contracts) is deﬁn e di nt e r m so fa
speciﬁc occupation. Hence, labor market institutions can aﬀect both the job creation margin
and the occupational mobility margin of natives in response to immigrants. More ﬂexible
labor markets could facilitate immigrants’ absorption, facilitating the job upgrading and job
creation, and thereby easing productive specialization of natives (Angrist and Kugler, 2003).
To check for this possibility, we re-estimate equations (10) and (11) interacting the main
explanatory variable (), the logarithm of the share of immigrants in the total population,
with several country-level indicators of employment protection legislation (EPL). In partic-
ular, we adopt six diﬀerent rankings based on EPL measures and we construct a dummy
(that we interact with ()) capturing whether the country has a high or low level of EPL.
The ﬁrst two measures of EPL are based on two ad hoc employer surveys conducted by the
European Commission in 1989 and 1994, respectively (European-Commission, 1991, 1995).
These indicators are based on the share of employers claiming that restrictions on hiring and
ﬁring were very important in the relevant year. We also use an aggregate OECD indicator
summarizing EPL in the 1990s based on averages of speciﬁc scores that classify countries
along the following dimensions: (i) strictness of employment protection for regular employ-
ment, (ii) norms concerning temporary employment, and (iii) rules on collective dismissals.16
Finally, we use each of these last three elementary measures. The six diﬀerent indicators
provide a robustness check for the results to the type of EPL index used and also to the
16OECD (1999), for details see pp. 64-68.
24countries included in the comparative analysis, since such indexes are not available for some
of the countries included this study.17 For each indicator, we deﬁne a country as a “high
EPL” one when its strictness in the labor laws is higher than the weighted average of the
surveyed countries. Similarly, “Low EPL” corresponds to a value of the strictness index
below the weighted average. As in the previous sections, we run both OLS and 2SLS regres-
sions estimated both on the whole sample and including men only. For simplicity, we report
main results for two indicators only: the EC89 and the OECD aggregate index. Evidence
emerging when using the other indicators (which is available upon request) is very similar18.
First of all, we assess the impact of immigration on employment rates (equation (11), Table
5). Irrespective of the speciﬁcation adopted and of the sample used for estimation, the es-
timates for  (the elasticity of natives’ employment rates with respect to immigrants’ share
in the population) for countries with below-average EPL are always greater than the ones
for countries with above-average EPL. However, due to the size of the standard errors, such
diﬀerences in the parameter estimates are often not statistically signiﬁcant. This result is
particularly strong when we consider the OECD measure of EPL and the preferred 2SLS
estimation. In that case, the positive employment eﬀect of immigration is much stronger
when estimated for countries with low EPL relative to those with high EPL. The diﬀerence
is signiﬁcant at standard conﬁdence levels. As for the diﬀerential impact of immigration on
employment rates of speciﬁc groups, there seems to be a similar eﬀe c tf o rb o t ht h em o r ea n d
less educated natives, who are much more responsive to immigration in countries with low
EPL.
Even more interesting is the extent of labor reallocation toward complex occupations
in response to increased immigration (equation (10)). As illustrated in Table 6, we ﬁnd
two very clear patterns. First, across speciﬁcations, the positive reallocation of natives
toward “complex” tasks is stronger in countries with low levels of EPL. The preferred 2SLS
estimates, using alternatively the EC89 index and the OECD aggregate one, we ﬁnd that
low EPL countries show coeﬃcient estimates in a range between 0.123 and 0.129 (always
signiﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level). The estimated coeﬃcients are considerably smaller
(ranging between 0.032 and 0.056) for high EPL countries, with the diﬀerence between the
17European Commission indicators are not available for Austria, Denmark and Finland; Luxembourg is
absent in OECD indexes as well.
18Using the EC89 index the countries with high EPL are: Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal. Luxembourg
is missing and the other countries are classiﬁed as low EPL.
25coeﬃcients being statistically signiﬁcant at 1% when considering results obtained using the
EC89 indicator. Results are even stronger when looking at the same estimates obtained on
the sample including only men (not reported and available upon request).
Another particularly interesting exercise is the assessment of diﬀerential interactions
between EPL and the extent of specialization among subgroups of workers, deﬁned alternat-
ively by age or education. When interacting () with two age-speciﬁc dummies, we ﬁnd
patterns similar to the ones found at the aggregate level: estimated elasticities are greater for
low EPL countries than for high EPL ones, both when considering young and old workers,
with diﬀerences between coeﬃcient estimates being statistically signiﬁcant at least at 5% in
most speciﬁcations. According to our preferred 2SLS estimates, in countries with low EPL
young and old workers alike respond to the inﬂow of immigrants with an elasticity of relo-
cation to “complex” jobs ranging between 0.12 and 0.16. To the contrary, in countries with
high EPL that elasticity is never larger than 0.059. Considering workers of diﬀerent schooling
levels it is interesting to notice that the change in specialization in response to immigrants
is particularly strong for less educated workers in countries with low EPL. The response of
less educated workers in ﬂexible labor markets is 0.12% for each 1% increase in the share of
immigrants, while in more rigid markets this value is equal to 0.06% at most. Diﬀerently,
for highly educated workers the point estimates do not show a clear pattern between high
and low EPL countries. In particular when considering the sample including both women
and men, the estimated elasticities for highly educated workers are never diﬀerent from zero
at standard conﬁdence levels both for high and low EPL countries. When looking at es-
timates obtained on the men only sample, parameter elasticities are positive and signiﬁcant
only for low EPL countries, but the diﬀerence between low and high EPL countries is never
statistically signiﬁcant.
These patterns support an interesting regularity. Namely, we ﬁnd that more “protected”
workers in more rigid labor markets, when confronted with shocks such as the inﬂow of
immigrants, are less able to respond and adjust. This may result in a less favorable impact of
migration. This idea has been previously proposed in order to explain the high and persistent
unemployment in Europe (vis-a-vis America) following the oil shocks of the seventies (e.g.
?). We argue that in a fast changing labor market, also due to the inﬂow of immigrants,
strong EPL’s limit the response of natives.
Moreover, these results, which hold across a number of speciﬁcations and indicators, con-
26ﬁrm the analysis of Angrist and Kugler (2003), who ﬁnd that low labor market ﬂexibility can
reduce gains from immigration and worsen its employment eﬀects. Our model and explana-
tion provides a reason for this. Countries in which native workers respond to a lesser extent
to immigration forgo some of the eﬃciency gains as well as the positive complementarity ef-
fect of immigration. Moreover, less educated workers, who are more vulnerable to foreigners,
being specialized in manual-routine tasks, are those who can potentially gain the most from
the positive job reallocation brought about by migration. Stricter EPL, preventing such a
reallocation, is thus particularly harmful for them.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
In the last ﬁfteen years, the labor markets of most developed countries have experienced a
secular increase in the number of jobs requiring more abstract and complex skills relative to
manual and routine skills. At the same time, Europe has been experiencing an unpreced-
ented increase in its immigrant population during the same period. Most of the economics
literature has focused on demand side factors explaining shifts in task demand: technolo-
gical change and the eﬀects of oﬀ-shoring and trade (Acemoglu and Autor, 2010). In this
paper we combine evidence on task changes and on immigration to analyze a supply factor,
namely the role of immigration, in determining such a change in the occupational structure
of natives. Our idea, summarized in a simple analytical framework, is that immigrants tend
to be specialized in occupations requiring mainly non-complex and routine skills. Immig-
rant inﬂows thus tend to reduce the supply of complex relative to non complex skills at the
economy level and increase the return to the ﬁrst type of skills. This creates an incentive
for native workers to move to occupations requiring relatively more abstract/complex skills.
This intuition is conﬁrmed by the empirical analysis conducted on European Labour Force
Survey data. This result withstands a number of robustness checks, carried out using dif-
ferent skill indicators, estimation methods, sample deﬁnitions, and, most signiﬁcantly, it is
robust to the use of credible instrumental variables. We also document the labor market
ﬂows through which such a positive reallocation took place: immigration stimulated hiring,
and a substantial skill upgrading was obtained because the complexity of jobs oﬀered to new
hires was higher relative to the one of separations. Finally, this positive reallocation process
is stronger in relatively ﬂexible labor markets, and in those markets is particularly promin-
ent for less educated workers. By moving to complex jobs, natives protect their wages from
27immigrant competition and take advantage of the creation of those jobs that complement
the manual tasks provided by immigrants. Letting this mechanism work may beneﬁtl e s s
educated natives, in particular through more job-creation (new hires) in those occupations.
Strong protection of labor hurts this mechanism and reduces labor markets’ ability to absorb
immigrants through occupational upgrading of natives.
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Table 1: The effect of Immigrants on Native Employment 
Units of Observations are eight education-by-age cells in 14 EU countries in each year, 1996-2007 
 
Dependent variable: log(employment rate of natives)      
Specification 1  2  3  4  5  6 
Sample  Women and men  Men only 
















                    
ln(fj,c,t) 
0.371 0.367  0.373  0.287  0.276  0.28 
[0.077]*** [0.088]***  [0.084]***  [0.081]***  [0.092]*** [0.078]***
            
ln(f j,c,t)*Young  0.429 0.426  0.463  0.347  0.339  0.382 
[0.080]*** [0.090]***  [0.072]***  [0.084]***  [0.095]*** [0.064]***
            
ln(f j,c,t)*Old  0.353 0.341  0.379  0.259  0.243  0.285 
[0.064]*** [0.072]***  [0.074]***  [0.066]***  [0.073]*** [0.063]***
            
ln(f j,c,t)*Low Edu  0.379 0.371  0.365  0.284  0.269  0.263 
[0.086]*** [0.098]***  [0.093]***  [0.092]***  [0.103]**  [0.086]***
            
ln(f j,c,t)*High Edu 
0.305 0.335 0.44  0.305  0.332  0.421 
[0.088]*** [0.102]***  [0.097]***  [0.084]***  [0.096]*** [0.102]***
            
Sample  Full Restricted  Restricted  Full Restricted  Restricted 
Obs  1517 740 740  1506  738  738 
Fixed effects            
Country by education   Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Education by year   Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of Employment/Population for the native population in the cell (equation 11 of section 
5.1). The main explanatory variable (row 1) is the log of the share of immigrants in the cell. In rows 2 and 3 it is interacted with 
Young/Old dummies, in rows 4 and 5 it is interacted with High/Low education dummies. In parenthesis we report the 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the country-education-age level. First-stage statistics for the shift share 
instrument are reported in table A5 of the appendix. The restricted sample is the one including only countries for which it is possible 
to construct the instrument. 




Table 2: The Effect of Immigrants on Task Performance of Natives 
Units of Observations are eight education-by-age cells in 14 EU countries in each year, 1996-2007 
Specification 1  2  3  4  5  6 
Sample  Women and Men  Men only 

















0.047 0.05  0.054  0.047  0.045  0.018 
[0.011]*** [0.013]*** [0.018]***  [0.016]***  [0.018]**  [0.017] 
Mental Tasks 
0.06 0.063 0.081  0.056  0.055  0.054 
[0.012]*** [0.014]*** [0.019]***  [0.011]***  [0.012]***  [0.013]*** 
Complex Tasks 
0.045 0.047  0.056  0.045  0.044  0.036 
[0.010]*** [0.011]*** [0.015]***  [0.010]***  [0.010]***  [0.012]*** 
Abstract Tasks (Goos et al 2009) 
0.998 0.926  1.177  1.438  1.35  1.504 
[0.434]** [0.479]*  [0.827]  [0.529]***  [0.580]**  [1.104] 
Non complex tasks 
Manual Tasks 
0.027 0.028  0.065  0.018  0.018  0.063 
[0.023] [0.027]  [0.029]**  [0.024]  [0.027]  [0.028]** 
Routine Tasks 
0.036 0.037  0.067  0.028  0.027  0.061 
[0.016]** [0.018]** [0.023]***  [0.017]*  [0.018]  [0.022]*** 
Routine Tasks (Goos et al. 2009) 
-0.46 -0.469 -0.158  -0.584  -0.573  0.446 
[0.350] [0.394]  [0.546]  [0.447]  [0.497]  [0.870] 
Sample  Full Restricted  Restricted  Full Restricted  Restricted 
Obs  1517 740  740  1506  738  738 
Fixed effects            
Country by education   Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Education by year   Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Note: Each coefficient in the table is estimated in a separate regression (equation 12, see section 5.2 for details). The dependent variable is the 
logarithm of task intensity performed by native workers in all the equations but those using the Goos et al. (2009) measures, estimated in levels since 
the corresponding values can be negative. The main explanatory variable is described in the first cell of the row. In parenthesis we report the 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the country-education-age level. First-stage statistics for the shift share instrument are 
reported in table A5 of the appendix. The restricted sample is the one including only countries for which it is possible to construct the instrument.  





Table 3: The Effects of Immigrants on Relative Task Performance of Natives 
Units of Observations are eight education-by-age cells in 14 EU countries in each year, 1996-2007 
 
Dependent variable: log(Relative complex/simple task intensity)    
Column 1  2  3  4  5  6 
Sample  Women and men  Men only 













Restricted    
Sample 
ln(fj,c,t)  0.054 0.057  0.061  0.054  0.052  0.024 
[0.013]*** [0.015]***  [0.018]***  [0.020]***  [0.023]**  [0.020] 
ln(f j,c,t)*Young  0.055 0.056  0.061  0.074  0.07  0.054 
[0.013]*** [0.015]***  [0.017]***  [0.015]***  [0.016]***  [0.019]*** 
ln(f j,c,t)*Old  0.053 0.057  0.061  0.044  0.042  0.026 
[0.013]*** [0.015]***  [0.018]***  [0.013]***  [0.014]***  [0.017] 
ln(f j,c,t)*Low edu  0.06 0.063 0.062  0.052  0.049  0.013 
[0.015]*** [0.016]***  [0.020]***  [0.023]**  [0.025]*  [0.021] 
ln(f j,c,t)*High edu 
0.01 0.006 0.052  0.065  0.07  0.113 
[0.018] [0.022]  [0.035] [0.019]***  [0.022]***  [0.038]*** 
Sample  Full Restricted  Restricted  Full Restricted  Restricted 
Obs  1508 740  740  1497  738  738 
Fixed effects            
Country by education   Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Education by year   Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the relative task intensity (equation 10 of section 3). The main explanatory variable (row 1) is the log of the share 
of immigrants in the cell. In rows 2 and 3 it is interacted with Young/Old dummies, in rows 4 and 5 it is interacted with High/Low education dummies. In 
parenthesis we report the heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the country-education-age level. First-stage statistics for the shift share instrument 
are reported in table A5 of the appendix. The restricted sample is the one including only countries for which it is possible to construct the instrument.   




Table 4: The Effect of Immigrants on employment flows and their task intensity 
Units of Observations are eight education-by-age cells in 14 EU countries in each year, 1996-2007 
 
Dependent variable: log of the variable specified in the header    
Column 1  2  3  4  5  6 
















Dep. Variable  Hirings rate 
ln(fj,c,t) 
0.174 0.196 0.419  -0.094  -0.048 0.131 
[0.191] [0.216]  [0.244]*  [0.183] [0.202]  [0.246] 
Dep. Variable  Hirings' relative complex/non complex skill intensity 
ln(fj,c,t) 
0.081 0.085 0.119 0.054 0.051  0.072 
[0.018]*** [0.020]*** [0.026]*** [0.019]***  [0.021]**  [0.031]** 
Dep. Variable  Separations rate 
ln(fj,c,t) 
0.042 0.064  -0.008  -0.108  -0.093 -0.173 
[0.065] [0.072] [0.080] [0.076] [0.084]  [0.082]** 
Dep. Variable  Separations' relative complex/non complex skill intensity 
ln(fj,c,t) 
0.051 0.058 0.074 0.007 0.002  0.01 
[0.015]*** [0.017]*** [0.023]***  [0.016]  [0.018]  [0.030] 
        
Sample  Full Restricted  Restricted Full Restricted  Restricted 
Obs  1508 740  740 1497 738  738 
Fixed effects         
Country by education   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Education by year   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
 
Note: Each coefficient in the table is estimated in a separate regression. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the variable specified in the 
header (see section 6 for details). In parenthesis we report the heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the country-education-age 
level. First-stage statistics for the shift share instrument are reported in table A5 of the appendix. The restricted sample is the one including only 
countries for which it is possible to construct the instrument. ***=significant at 1%; **=significant at 5%, **=significant at 1%. 
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Table 5: The Effect of Immigrants on native employment, by EPL levels 
Dependent variable: log(employment rate) in the edu-age cell; all workers   
Column   1 2 3 4 5 6 

















EPL 0.449 0.413 0.451 0.517 0.573 1.584 
  [0.173]** [0.189]** [0.223]**  [0.170]*** [0.237]** [0.393]***
*High 
EPL 0.335 0.323 0.289 0.292 0.294 0.269 




EPL 0.453 0.423  0.53  0.52  0.573 1.954 
 [0.148]*** [0.161]**  [0.165]*** [0.151]*** [0.207]*** [0.592]***
*High 
EPL 0.425 0.446 0.386  0.47  0.478 0.471 




EPL 0.382 0.347 0.464 0.492 0.561  2.14 
 [0.125]*** [0.134]**  [0.178]**  [0.134]*** [0.200]*** [0.714]***
*High 
EPL 0.341 0.335 0.279 0.337 0.343 0.335 




EPL 0.469 0.427 0.411 0.571 0.631  1.67 
 [0.196]**  [0.215]*  [0.238]*  [0.196]*** [0.275]** [0.457]***
*High 
EPL 0.335 0.321 0.282 0.289 0.291 0.255 




EPL 0.322 0.322 1.094 0.271  0.32  1.068 
 [0.159]**  [0.173]*  [0.574]*  [0.137]** [0.182]*  [0.589]* 
*High 
EPL 0.343 0.354 0.353 0.347  0.35  0.374 
   [0.096]*** [0.101]*** [0.118]*** [0.092]*** [0.094]*** [0.115]***
Obs      930 620 620  1407  740 740 
Fixed effects          
Country by 
education   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education by year   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: Each coefficient in the table is estimated from equation 11 (see section 7 for details). The dependent variable is the logarithm 
of Employment/Population for the native population in the cell. The main explanatory variable (row 1) is the log of the share of 
immigrants in the cell, by EPL level. In rows 2 and 3 it is further interacted with Young/Old dummies, in rows 4 and 5 it is 
interacted with High/Low education dummies. In parenthesis we report the heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at 
the country-education-age level. First-stage statistics for the shift share instrument are reported in table A5 of the appendix. 
Luxembourg is never included in EPL rankings. EC89 does not rank Austria, Denmark and Finland. See text (section 7) and OECD 
(1999, pp. 64-68) for details on the EPL indexes.  




Table 6: The Effect of Immigrants on Task Performance of natives, by EPL levels 
Dependent variable: relative complex/non complex skill intensity (all workers)    
Column    1 2 3 4 5 6 
EPL MEASURE    EC89  OECD 
Estimates    OLS  OLS IV OLS  OLS IV 
ln(fj,c,t) 
*Low  EPL  0.095 0.097 0.129 0.057 0.069 0.123 
 [0.023]*** [0.025]*** [0.038]*** [0.020]*** [0.025]*** [0.043]***
*High  EPL  0.032 0.029 0.032 0.052 0.052 0.056 
 [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.010]*** [0.016]*** [0.017]*** [0.018]***
P value ftest Low EPL=high EPL  0.0118 0.0098 0.0112 0.8614 0.5789 0.1254 
ln(fj,c,t)*  Young 
*Low EPL  0.096  0.097  0.12  0.055  0.073  0.148 
 [0.023]*** [0.024]*** [0.034]*** [0.018]*** [0.027]*** [0.046]***
*High  EPL  0.042 0.034 0.036  0.05 0.051 0.059 
 [0.012]*** [0.011]*** [0.012]*** [0.015]*** [0.015]*** [0.017]***
P value ftest Low EPL=high EPL  0.0376 0.0209 0.0141 0.8359 0.4557 0.0558 
ln(fj,c,t)*  Old 
*Low  EPL  0.102 0.105 0.129 0.051 0.078 0.162 
 [0.026]*** [0.027]*** [0.037]*** [0.017]*** [0.029]** [0.055]***
*High EPL  0.033  0.029  0.03  0.052  0.052  0.057 
 [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.010]*** [0.015]*** [0.016]*** [0.018]***
P value ftest Low EPL=high EPL  0.0128 0.0097  0.009  0.9683 0.4389 0.0615 
ln(fj,c,t)* Low edu 
*Low  EPL  0.111 0.113 0.124 0.069 0.087 0.112 
 [0.024]*** [0.025]*** [0.040]*** [0.021]*** [0.024]*** [0.042]***
*High EPL  0.034  0.03  0.032  0.055  0.056  0.058 
 [0.009]*** [0.008]*** [0.010]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.020]***
P value ftest Low EPL=high EPL  0.0033 0.0029 0.0224  0.614 0.2914 0.2221 
ln(fj,c,t)* High edu 
*Low EPL  -0.004  -0.008  0.205  0.001  -0.009  0.188 
  [0.034] [0.036] [0.226] [0.028] [0.038] [0.217] 
*High  EPL  0.023 0.02 0.028 0.02 0.02 0.037 
 [0.013]*  [0.013]  [0.030]  [0.012]* [0.013] [0.032] 
P value ftest Low EPL=high EPL  0.4188 0.435 0.4012  0.4848  0.4306  0.4493 
Obs      929 619 619  1397  738 738 
Fixed effects                      
Country by education   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education by year       Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Each coefficient in the table is estimated in a separate regression. The dependent variable is the logarithm of Complex  relative to 
Simple task intensity performed by native workers. The main explanatory variable (row 1) is the log of the share of immigrants in the cell, by 
EPL level. In rows 2 and 3 it is further interacted with Young/Old dummies, in rows 4 and 5 it is interacted with High/Low education 
dummies. In parenthesis we report the heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the country-education-age level. First-stage 
statistics for the shift share instrument are reported in table A5 of the appendix. Luxembourg is never included in EPL rankings. EC89 does 
not rank Austria, Denmark and Finland. See text (section 7) and OECD (1999, pp. 64-68) for details on the EPL indexes.  






Figure 1: Immigrants as percentage of the European Population 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations on EULFS data. It does not include countries for which one or more years of data are missing 

































































Relative productive tasks, Natives and Foreign-Born in Europe 
 
 
Authors’ calculations on EULFS data.  
It does not include countries for which one or more years of data are missing  
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Figure 3  
Relative productive tasks and the share of immigrants in Western Europe,  
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Note: Authors’ calculations on EULFS data. 
Fitted values estimated from a weighted OLS regression of relative task intensities (Complex/Non Complex) on the 
share of foreign born population and a constant with standard errors clustered at the country level.  The estimated 




Tables and Figures Appendix 
 
Figure A1: Immigrants by education in Europe 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations on EULFS data.  
It does not include countries for which one or more years of data are missing 
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IV  Country 
Year 
Tot 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Austria  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  12 12 
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  12 0 
Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  12 0 
Spain  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  12 12 
Finland  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  12 0 
France  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  12 12 
Grece  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  12 12 
Ireland  0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 7  0 
Italy  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3  3 
Luxembourg  1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  11 0 
Netherlands  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  12 0 
Norway  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  12 0 
Portugal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  12 12 
United 
Kingdom 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  11 11 
Tot  12 12 10 13 13 13 13 13 13 14 13 13  152 74 
 
Note: 0 denotes a country/year not included in the empirical analysis (16 out of 168) since one of the main variables  
(education, age, country of birth, occupation) is completely missing. 




Skill’s composition in terms of abilities/tasks 
Complex tasks / mental skills (C )  Simple skills (S) 
Communication Manual 
Oral Comprehension   Arm-Hand Steadiness  
Oral Expression   Auditory Attention  
Speech Clarity   Control Precision  
Speech Recognition   Depth Perception  
Written Comprehension   Dynamic Flexibility  
Written Expression   Dynamic Strength  
  Explosive Strength  
Complex  Extent Flexibility  
Coaching and Developing Others   Far Vision  
Communicating with Persons Outside Organization  Finger Dexterity  
Communicating with Supervisors, Peers  Glare Sensitivity  
Coordinating the Work and Activities of Others  Gross Body Coordination  
Developing and Building Teams   Gross Body Equilibrium  
Developing Objectives and Strategies   Hearing Sensitivity  
Estimating the Quantifiable Characteristics of Products  Manual Dexterity  
Guiding, Directing, and Motivating Subordinates  Multilimb Coordination  
Identifying Objects, Actions, and Events   Near Vision  
Interpreting the Meaning of Information for Others  Night Vision  
Judging the Qualities of Things, Services, or People  Peripheral Vision  
Making Decisions and Solving Problems   Rate Control  
Performing for or Working Directly with the Public  Reaction Time  
Processing Information   Response Orientation  
Provide Consultation and Advice to Others   Sound Localization  
Resolving Conflicts and Negotiating with Others  Speed of Limb Movement  
Selling or Influencing Others   Stamina  
Thinking Creatively   Static Strength  
Training and Teaching Others   Trunk Strength  
Updating and Using Relevant Knowledge   Visual Color Discrimination  
  Wrist-Finger Speed  
Mental   
Category Flexibility   Routine 
Deductive Reasoning   Controlling Machines and Processes  
Flexibility of Closure   Documenting/Recording Information  
Fluency of Ideas   Handling and Moving Objects  
Inductive Reasoning   Monitor Processes, Materials, or Surroundings 
Information Ordering   Monitoring and Controlling Resources  
Mathematical Reasoning   Performing General Physical Activities  
Memorization    
Number Facility    
Originality    
Perceptual Speed    
Problem Sensitivity    
Selective Attention    
Spatial Orientation    
Speed of Closure    
Time Sharing    
Visualization     
This table reports skill and tasks intensities used to construct each of our broad skill measures.  




The skill content of each occupation 
   Manual  Mental  Communic.  Routine  Complex 
    Score Rk Score Rk Score Rk Score Rk Score Rk
Corporate  managers  27  18 80 3 79 5 47  13 83 3 
Managers of small enterprises  16  20 69  8  92  1  50  12 97  1 
Physical, mathematical and engineering professionals  34  15 85  1  56  10  34  17 63  9 
Lifescience  and  health  professionals  46  12 82 2 86 2 75 6 89 2 
Other  professionals  34  14 61 9 67 8 42  14 74 5 
Physical, mathematical and engineering associate prof.  36  13 77  5  48  13  39  16 61  10
Life science and health associate professionals  63  8  72  7  81  4  82  4  71  6 
Other associate professionals  15  21 72  6  74  7  27  19 67  7 
Office  clerks  29 17 47 13 59  9  33 18 44 14
Customer service clerks  29  16 77  4  81  3  19  20 46  13
Personal and protective service workers  59  10 50  12 51  12  51  11 54  11
Models, salesperson and demonstrators  18  19 59  10 77  6  15  21 66  8 
Extraction and building trades workers  62  9  57  11 55  11  90  1  80  4 
Metal, machinery and related tradework  84  3  42  15 19  19  75  7  30  17
Precision, handicraft, craft printing and related trade workers  68  6  35  18 26  15  64  10 35  16
Other craft and related trade workers  74  5  18  21 9  21  83  3  22  21
Stationary plant and related operators  65  7  27  19 23  18  86  2  40  15
Machine operators and assemblers  82  4  36  17 16  20  77  5  30  18
Drivers and mobile plant operators  88  1  38  16 24  16  69  9  28  20
Sales and service elementary occupations  55  11 25  20 35  14  42  15 28  19
Laborers in mining, construction,manufacturing and transport  87  2  46  14 24  17  73  8  49  12
Source: authors’ calculations on O*NET and 2000 US census.  
For each occupation, the score is equal to the percentile along the distribution of skill intensities.  
To give an idea of the indicators, a score of 79 in "communication skills" for "corporate 
managers" indicates that 79% of all workers in US in 2000 were using "communication 









Goos et al (2009)  Our definition 
Abstract Routine 
Complex ( C)  Non Complex 
(NC)  (C/NC)
Mental Communication Complex Manual Routine Relative
Aged 15-24  -0.470  0.296  -0.310  -0.344  -0.333  0.313  0.174  -0.343 
Aged 25-34  0.028  -0.025  0.136  0.056  0.062  0.023  0.000  0.087 
Aged 35-44  0.145  -0.073  0.142  0.135  0.156  -0.047  0.010  0.125 
Aged 45-54  0.168  -0.088  0.082  0.107  0.103  -0.101  -0.040  0.095 
Aged  55-64 0.122  -0.109 -0.076  0.032  -0.005 -0.197 -0.155 0.021 
                    
High edu  0.869  -0.891  0.740  0.715  0.613  -0.837  -0.796  0.793 






First stage statistics for the instruments 
Column   1  2 
      Women and men  Men only 
ln(f j,c,t) 
Coeff 0.99  1.050 
Std error  [0.033]***  [0.033]*** 
Ftest 69.27  58.08 
ln(f j,c,t)*  
Young 
Coeff 1.035  1.058 
Std error  [0.026]***  [0.027]*** 
Ftest 533.80  515.20 
ln(f j,c,t)*  
Old 
Coeff 0.899  0.954 
Std error  [0.022]***  [0.025]*** 
Ftest 756.82  590.91 
ln(f j,c,t)*  
Low edu 
Coeff 1.052  1.113 
Std error  [0.029]***  [0.032]*** 
Ftest 390.03  319.71 
ln(f j,c,t)*  
High edu 
Coeff 0.688  0.708 
Std error  [0.030]***  [0.036]*** 
Ftest 1305.09  986.67 
 
This table reports the first stage statistics for the shift-share instrument. We calculate immigrants' distribution across countries 
and cells for year 1991. The instrument is then obtained multiplying, for each year and country of origin, this fixed distribution by 
the total growth in the stock of immigrants from that country of origin (see section 3.1 for details).  